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A Problem With Method in Theological Anthropology: 
Towards an All-Inclusive Theology 
 
ABSTRACT: Although most of the theological anthropologies that have been developed in 
modern times purport to apply to all human beings, recent theologians representing the 
causes of feminism, the liberation of the poor and oppressed, or those with disabilities, to 
name just a few examples, have repeatedly complained that mainstream theologies exclude or 
at least fail to include these causes amongst their concerns. In this paper, I will draw on the 
work of Thomas Aquinas to outline a possible framework for incorporating into mainstream 
systematic theology these theologians’ critiques as well as their constructive efforts to 
account for the image of God in the aforementioned parties. The key to accomplishing this 
task, I will argue, involves the development of a more differentiated account of sin, which 
addresses the way that both those included and seemingly excluded from traditional accounts 
experience and commit sin.  
 
KEYWORDS: Feminist Theology, Image of God, David Kelsey, Liberation Theology, 
Theological Anthropology, Sin, Thomas Aquinas, Virtues, Vices  
  
 Since the dawn of Christian intellectual history, some of the greatest theological 
minds have devoted considerable attention to treating one of the central loci of Christian 
doctrine, namely, theological anthropology, or the study of human beings as creatures—
indeed images—of God.1 Although most of the theological anthropologies that have been 
developed in modern times purport to apply to all human beings, recent theologians 
representing the causes of feminism, the liberation of the poor and oppressed, or those with 
disabilities, to name just a few examples, have repeatedly complained that mainstream 
theologies exclude or at least fail to include these causes amongst their concerns.2 
 In this paper, my purpose is to outline a possible framework for incorporating into 
mainstream systematic theology these theologians’ critiques as well as their constructive 
efforts to account for the image of God in the aforementioned parties, among others.                                                         
1 For an early example, see Augustine’s De Trinitate, books 8-15. More recent examples can 
be found in Jürgen Moltmann, Man (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971); Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985). 
2 See John Swinton, ‘Who is the God We Worship? Theologies of Disability: Challenges and 
New Possibilities’, International Journal of Practical Theology 14.2 (Jan. 2011), pp. 273-
307. 
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Although they have not often been recognized as such, such efforts are of direct relevance to 
theological anthropology, in that they seek to account for the humanity before God of persons 
who have evidently not been written into mainstream systematic theology. The key to 
incorporating those efforts, I will argue, involves a methodological shift in terms of the 
current theological tendency to treat the nature of sin in a rather one-sided manner, that is, 
from the perspective of those with the power to exclude or include.3 What is called for, 
therefore, is the development of a more differentiated account of sin, which addresses the 
way that both those included and seemingly excluded from traditional accounts experience 
and commit sin.  
Although, in this regard, I will in some ways simply add to an existing body of 
critique concerning mainstream doctrines of sin, and join forces with those who have tried to 
construct the ‘other perspective’ on sin, I will seek to move beyond existing material on 
another level, precisely by sketching an initial framework for articulating a two-fold typology 
of sin, in which the perspective of both the included and the excluded is inscribed into the 
very structures of hamartiology. In addition to representing the viewpoint of both parties in 
question, rather than those of only one or the other, such a framework might enhance the 
available resources for systematizing and differentiating the ‘other’ views on sin, which tend 
to arise from experience and are sometimes therefore presented in a fashion that is either 
somewhat diffuse or parasitic on the accounts of sin critiqued. 
With a view to developing this framework, I will draw, albeit constructively, on the 
work of Thomas Aquinas, a very traditional thinker for the present purposes, who, while 
affirming the image of God in women, for example, would certainly not have been thinking 
in terms of what it would mean to create ‘equal opportunities’ for them to reflect that image.4 
The added benefit of invoking Aquinas, of all thinkers, is that doing so shows that resources 
can be identified within the mainstream discussion itself for incorporating insights on sin that 
might resonate with those associated with the aforementioned causes—let us call them causes 
of liberation, where ‘liberation’ is defined in the broadest sense of the term.  
In that regard, the use of Aquinas may have the power to address potential anxieties 
and a corresponding reluctance on the part of mainstream theologians at the thought of 
overhauling their discipline to accommodate other perspectives. For it not only provides an 
idea of how to affirm alternative points of view, but also confirms that the project in question                                                         
3 On this, see Joy Ann McDougall, ‘Sin No More? A Feminist Re-visioning of a Christian 
Theology of Sin’, Anglican Theological Review 88.2 (Spring 2006), pp. 215-235. 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ST), Ia.92.  
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is not a zero-sum game, in which showing consideration for questions of liberation 
necessitates relinquishing the concerns represented in existing theologies, or indeed 
‘scratching’ the whole preceding tradition of ‘male-stream’ theology. By outlining a broadly 
Thomist typology of sin, consequently, I will aim to open doors for, and encourage, further 
efforts to create a natural space, rather than an appendix, in mainstream theology for the 
systematic articulation of the concerns raised by liberation thinkers.  
As things stand, such concerns are ordinarily presented in mainline theological texts 
or ‘handbooks’, if at all, in designated chapters where their content presumably cannot affect 
the construal of core doctrines or be called to the attention of those who focus on them.5 By 
the same token, the theology of liberation thinkers continues to be written from diverse 
liberation ‘perspectives’. In contrast to the general tendency to treat such theologies as 
‘perspectival’, ‘contextual’, or representative of minority and thus to some extent marginal 
points of view, I will treat them as impetuses to develop an ‘all-inclusive theology’, which 
draws under its auspices both those formerly included, and those formerly excluded, who 
collectively represent a majority point of view.  
Such a theology, which accommodates both perspectives within the scope of a single 
line of inquiry, is essential on my understanding to the integrity of theological anthropology 
and to systematic theology more generally. After all, it is inconsistent with the divine design 
to empower all persons to realize their human potential and thereby image God that some be 
enabled to do so, at the expense of others. With a view to expanding on what such an 
inclusive theology might involve, I will start below by explaining more clearly the sort of 
critique a liberation thinker might mount against mainstream theological anthropologies, with 
reference to a few examples drawn from feminist theology. I will then assess the extent to 
which some recent work in theological anthropology, particularly that of David Kelsey, has 
addressed those critiques. 
Subsequently, I will offer a brief description of what it means to reflect God’s image, 
based on the classic teachings of Thomas Aquinas, who himself benefits in many ways from 
the thought of Augustine. Contrary to the opinion of some, these and other traditional 
theological teachings, for instance, on the image of God and theological anthropology more 
generally, do not need to be discarded just because they need to be nuanced by a more 
differentiated account of the sins that must be overcome if all persons are to realize that                                                         
5 For examples of this phenomenon, see the Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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image.6 Finally, I will outline a two-fold typology of sin derived from the thought of Aquinas 
in further detail, before showing in a concluding section how it might facilitate the 
development of a more inclusive theological anthropology.  
 
The Critique of Traditional Doctrines of Sin 
 
 The critique of mainstream doctrines of sin, to say nothing of accounts of human 
personhood or the image of God, is widespread in liberation literature.7 For the sake of space, 
however, I will limit my discussion to the related critiques of several feminist theologians, 
who call attention to the way mainstream theologies tend to overlook their experiences in 
ways that are emblematic of wider liberation trends. One well-known and relatively early 
theological critique is presented by Valerie Saiving-Goldstein in her influential article, ‘The 
Human Situation: A Feminine View’.8 In this article, Goldstein outlines “a widespread 
tendency in contemporary theology to describe man’s predicament as rising from his 
separateness and the anxiety occasioned by it, and to identify sin with self-assertion and love 
with selflessness,”9 or self-sacrifice.  
While Goldstein emphatically denies “any hard-and fast distinctions between men and 
women as such,”10 and thus eschews gender roles and stereotypes rooted in a basic biological 
difference, she does acknowledge some common dispositional differences, which play out 
differently depending on social context and conditioning. 11 On account of these dispositional 
differences, women cannot ordinarily be said to sin in terms of “pride, will-to-power, 
exploitation, self-assertiveness, and the treatment of others as objects rather than persons.”12 
In that sense, the standard “conception of redemption as restoring to man what he 
fundamentally lacks, namely, sacrificial love, the I-Thou relationship,”13 seemingly does not 
apply to most women, either.                                                          
6 Daphne Hampson goes so far as to argue that Christianity should be rejected because of its 
potential for exclusiveness, in After Christianity (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 
1996).  
7 See works by Gustavo Gutierrez, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Elizabeth Johnson, Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza, and others. 
8 Valerie Saiving-Goldstein in her influential article, ‘The Human Situation: A Feminine 
View’, The Journal of Religion 40.2 (Apr. 1960), pp. 100-112.  
9 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 100. 
10 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 101. 
11 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 106. 
12 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 107. 
13 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 107. 
 5 
Because of the way women are connected to child-bearing and thus a whole network 
of personal relationships, rather, Goldstein argues that their sins are better described in terms 
of “triviality, distractibility, and diffuseness; lack of an organizing center or focus; 
dependence on others for one’s own self-definition; tolerance at the expense of standards of 
excellence; inability to respect the boundaries of privacy; sentimentality, gossipy sociability, 
and mistrust of reason—in short, underdevelopment or negation of the self.”14 In point of 
fact, Goldstein contends, the situation of women as regards sin is the opposite to that of men. 
For this reason, it must be overcome by diametrically opposing means, indeed, through a self-
assertive attitude that traditional theology, defined in terms of masculine experience, 
continues to speak of “as sin or temptation to sin.”15 
Following Goldstein, who argued that Reinhold Niebuhr gives the ‘most 
uncompromising expression’16 to the one-sided, masculine view of sin just outlined, Judith 
Plaskow sustains a book-length critique not only of Niebuhr but also of Paul Tillich. On her 
reading, Niebuhr is a classic example of one who equates sin with pride, that is, a self-
aggrandizing positioning of the self over and against others, which can only be corrected by 
self-denial and self-sacrifice.17 As Plaskow also acknowledges, Niebuhr allows for a second 
possibility of sinning through sensuality, or a tendency to get too caught up in temporal 
things. While the notion of sin as sensuality might have enabled Niebuhr to account for the 
feminine experience of sin, Plaskow points out with regret that he does not develop it along 
these lines.18 Rather, he treats sensuality only insofar as it is an outworking of the prideful 
desire to dominate others, or idolatrously to objectify them, and thus defines it in terms of the 
misuse of sexuality.19  
Since the female body is apparently regarded in this instance as the impetus to sin 
through sensuality, one might observe that women seem here to be conflated with the 
inappropriate sexual urges that require to be conquered and scorned in Niebuhr’s account. As 
Rosemary Radford Reuther has become known for arguing, women are equated in such 
accounts with unruly ‘nature’, which must be subjected to the control and used for the benefit 
                                                        
14 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 109. 
15 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 110. 
16 Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation’, 100. 
17 Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (Boston, Mass.: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 54-62.  18 Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, 63. 19 Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, 61. 
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of a dominating mind or spirit.20 While women seem to be objectified explicitly in this 
instance, Plaskow concludes that Niebuhr’s conception of sin as pride opens women up to 
objectification implicitly, insofar as it fails to capture the feminine experience of sin, as she 
describes it very much in keeping with Goldstein’s outlook.21 The same goes for Tillich’s 
conception of sin as estrangement from the self or others, not least because Tillich defines 
estrangement in terms of hubris and other ‘male’ qualities.22  
In her own turn, Daphne Hampson picks up on the work of Goldstein and especially 
Plaskow in her chapter on ‘anthropology’ in Theology and Feminism.23 Following these 
women, she challenges Niebuhr’s idea that sin manifests in a prideful attempt to take the 
place of God in one’s own life, and subject others to one’s own will, noting like the others 
that the problem for women is not to learn to be a self in relation to others but to be a self in 
relation.24 Although Niebuhr has been particularly hard-hit by feminists like the 
aforementioned, their general critique, which is echoed in different ways in the wider body of 
‘liberation’ literature, has been shown to apply to many other modern theologians including 
Karl Barth, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, insofar as their accounts fail 
at very least to capture the experience of sin that is proper to those who simply do not enjoy 
the prerogative to assert a ‘will to power’.25 
As countless liberation thinkers have noted, such exclusiveness towards ‘minorities’ 
is not merely neutral in its impact. For by neglecting pro-actively to provide the resources the 
marginalized need to identify the sins from which they require to be liberated, mainstream                                                         20 See chapter 3 of Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-Talk (London: SCM, 1983).  
21 Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, pp. 9-50 (women’s experience); pp. 62-73 (Niebhur). 
22 Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace, pp. 95-148 (Tillich). 
23 Hampson, Theology and Feminism, pp. 116-47 (Anthropology). 
24 Hampson, Theology and Feminism, pp. 118. 
25 Judith Vaughn, Sociality, Ethics and Social Change: A Critical Appraisal of Reinhold 
Niebhur’s Ethics in the Light of Rosemary Radford Ruether’s Works (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1983). Not unlike Niebhur, Wolfhart Pannenberg defines sin in terms of 
egotistical pride in his Anthropology in Theological Perspectives. Whereas many such 
accounts purport to apply to all persons, there are others, such as that of Karl Barth, who was 
famously content to describe the role of women in ‘complementarian’ as opposed to 
egalitarian terms, which some might say denies their full humanity and conflates their 
‘virtue’ with submissiveness, responsiveness, or passivity, where feminists would see such 
attitudes as potential areas of feminine sin. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/2, ch. 10, 
ed. G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960). See also Rachel Muers’ 
critique of Barth (and von Balthasar) in ‘The Mute Cannot Keep Silent’, in Diana Lipton and 
Janet Martin Soskice (eds), Feminism and Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). See also Reuther’s critique of Barth and the Calvinist tradition in Sexism and God-
Talk, 83-4.  
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theologies passively thwart their efforts to image God and exercise their humanity. Implicitly, 
therefore, these theologies dehumanize minorities in ways that not only preclude their 
potential competition in desirable areas of human work and inquiry, but also legitimize their 
objectification, oppression, and the enlistment of their services for personal ends. As such, 
the neglect of mainstream theologies to develop resources relevant to the project of liberation 
seemingly bespeaks a fundamental, if unarticulated, or unconscious, but nonetheless culpable 
desire to further a situation in which it is possible to suppress the subjectivity or agency of 
others without being called into account, or even recognized, as doing so.  
While it is clear that those excluded cannot realize their own humanity and image 
God in the way he designed under these circumstances, it could be argued that the imago dei 
is also undermined in this instance in those who passively disempower the oppressed, even if 
less obviously so. As I already noted, there is something deeply antithetical about efforts to 
image a God who empowers all persons to exercise their humanity to his glory, which turn on 
withholding the opportunities others would need to do the same. This raises a question 
towards which I already gestured as to whether it is possible for anyone to image God, let 
alone to articulate a sound theological anthropology, apart from an account in which all are 
fully equipped to do so.  
 Although a growing number of works which call for this theological ‘de-segregation’, 
and corresponding ‘subjectification’ of women and other excluded parties, there has been 
very little evidence to this point of responsiveness to the call on the part of the male-stream 
theologies themselves. In effect, consequently, theological anthropology has remained 
hermetically sealed off to the vast majority of human beings, such that their outcries have 
continued to go theologically unheard. Ironically, therefore, the field of inquiry in question 
might be regarded as both un-theological and un-anthropological—a defeater of its own 
purposes and a contradiction to itself.  
 While this conclusion may have obtained with reference to many of the theological 
anthropologies that have been developed in the past, it remains to consider whether very 
recent work in the field has moved the discussion forward in the relevant respects. In this 
connection, I turn now to consider David Kelsey’s two-volume work entitled, Eccentric 
Existence, a monumental scholarly achievement with which no current intervention in the 
field of theological anthropology can neglect to interact.26 Although Kelsey’s work covers a 
diverse range of issues that are relevant to the study of theological anthropology, including                                                         
26 David Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 2 vols. (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2009).  
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ideas about human nature, the relationship between human beings and God, and the doctrine 
of the Incarnation of the Son of God, his treatment of sin is most pertinent in the present 
context for obvious reasons and will be the focus of the discussion below.  
In developing a hamartiology that is consistent with his broader perspectives, Kelsey 
stresses the impossibility of providing a systematic account or ‘list’ of individual sins, which 
would obscure the utterly diverse and individual ways in which sin is committed. Instead, 
Kelsey offers a detailed and tremendously insightful typology of sins, which he calls 
‘existential hows’.27 Initially, Kelsey defines sin as “a distortion of faith’s loyalty to God’s 
creative project.”28 For Kelsey, this distortion always expresses itself in a distortion of 
persons, or what Kelsey calls ‘personal bodies’, orientation “to their proximate contexts that 
are largely made up of networks of interactions among fellow creatures.”29  
Although he draws a distinction between sin—before God—and evil—towards other 
creatures—nevertheless he recognizes that sin tends to manifest itself through evil.30 In 
addition to the types of sin that spring from distorted faith, Kelsey speaks of sins that 
represent a distortion of trust in God and thus a “distortion of personal bodies’ orientation to 
their ultimate context.”31 Finally, there are sins that represent “distortions of human 
creatures’ responses in love to the triune God relating to them in incarnate agape to reconcile 
them structurally,”32 not only with God but also with other personal bodies.33 In sum, there 
are sinful distortions of faith, hope, and love, which pertain to God’s creative, consummative, 
and conciliatory work, respectively. 
While the range of types of sin that Kelsey associates with these three broader 
categories of sin is vast, there are recurring themes, some of which are highly germane to the 
present discussion. These are the themes on which I will focus in what follows. One such 
theme is covered in Kelsey’s treatment of ways in which faith can be corrupted, namely, 
through distorted practices of wonder. In distorted wonder, he writes, “perception is separated 
from faithful respect for fellow creatures’ concrete particularity…Such perception invites 
exploitation of what is perceived.”34 As a result “fellow creatures are perceived as instances 
                                                        
27 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, pp. 419-21. 
28 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 412. 
29 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 412. 
30 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 405. 
31 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 412. 
32 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 865. 
33 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 847. 
34 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 415. 
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of stereotypes,”35 whether sexist, racist, or classist, that are not true to the reality of those 
creatures and that are harmful to them.  
In making this point already, Kelsey by contrast to some of his modern theological 
predecessors, proves himself fully attuned to the liberation critiques which by this point in 
time can no longer be easily ignored. The evident concern on his part to facilitate liberation 
comes into fuller relief in his subsequent treatment of the way personal bodies may live ‘at 
cross-grain’ to their actual, God-given identities, by trusting in things other than God as the 
ground of their reality and value.36 Though Kelsey lists numerous ways of doing this, the 
most relevant here involves trusting in what he calls the ‘quotidian’, or daily circumstances, 
rather than God, to ground personal value. This can lead to trusting in stereotypes as the 
ground of one’s value, which not only results in individuals being “passively defined as 
minimally agentic, scarcely at all the agents of their own lives,”37 but also to their being 
treated as “disposable instrumental means”38 to the end of securing another’s reality and 
value.39  
 In a subsequent chapter, Kelsey argues in this connection that “it is morally 
imperative to resist and correct unjust diminution of human well-being. Enactment of such 
practices is inherent in faithful response to God’s relating to humankind creatively.”40 That 
said, he distinguishes human flourishing, which is defined “by virtue of God’s absolute self-
commitment to relate to them creatively and to draw them into eschatological 
consummation,”41 from human well-being, which “is measured in degrees along several 
different but complexly inter-related axes (physical, psychological, social, cultural, etc.).”42 
In this and subsequent chapters, he draws attention to the problems that arise from conflating 
the two categories of well-being and flourishing, or pursuing one in isolation, even while 
acknowledging that because of the way God has related to humanity through the incarnation,                                                         
35 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 415. 
36 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, pp. 422-3. 
37 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 425. 
38 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 428. 
39 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 437: “For those whose agency of their own lives is 
systemically undermined in personal identities distorted by acquiescence in others’ 
stereotypes of them, and who nevertheless trust their acceptance of those stereotypes to 
ground the reality and value of their lives, death ceases to be a universal feature of living and 
becomes the dominant good, the liberator to be longed for. To live with no possibility of 
being the agent of one’s own life is to live not just a dying life but the living death of the 
radically oppressed.” 
40 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 570 (chapter 16). 
41 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 570.  
42 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 570.  
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“human creatures’ proximate and ultimate contexts coincide.”43 
In a discussion of distorted love, for instance, Kelsey notes that when we try to love 
our neighbors in the absence of prayer, which he defines in quite general terms as an 
orientation towards God, and so try to put things right in our proximate contexts without 
reference to their ultimate context, we can “deepen the distortion of the lives of fellow 
estranged human creatures.”44 Although “such practices of love as neighbor may be 
impressively moral and even self-sacrificing in their self-forgetful, undistractedly intensive 
focus on the suffering and oppression undergone by particular fellow human creatures,”45 he 
writes, they are dangerous to their beneficiaries nonetheless, because they lack “reference to 
an ultimate context that relativizes them and lays the actions of the finite human creatures 
under judgment from a perspective other than the one provided by their proximate contexts 
themselves', which may be based on prejudices, biases, cultural values, common wisdom 
[self-delusions, competitiveness, and ignorance46] that need to be criticized or called into 
question.”47  
That is to say, practices of neighbor-love without prayer “lack adequate basis for 
critical distance on other human creatures’ own answers to the question ‘what actions will in 
fact, in particular circumstances, make for our well being as the particular human creatures 
we are in our particular proximate contexts’.”48 Since the approach to helping the poor, 
victimized, and oppressed in question “assumes superior wisdom of others’ judgments about 
this question,”49 Kelsey concludes, it denies them the right to answer that question 
themselves. By treating the needy as voiceless objects of patronizing charity, consequently, 
this approach leaves room for benefactors, no matter how seemingly self-sacrificing, to give 
the needy only what they want to give, which may not be what the needy need to receive, and 
which may in fact lock them in to their state of marginalization and oppression. 
In his final chapter on sin as distorted love, Kelsey contests the ideas of personal 
identity that are evidently at the root of all forms of oppression, even those that appear under                                                         
43 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 854 (see chapters 16, 17, 24). 
44 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 853. 
45 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 853. 
46 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 856. 
47 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 855. Kelsey undertakes a parallel discussion in chapter 16’s 
treatment of distorted hopeful practices that are based on the not yet and now of 
eschatological blessing; and in chapter 17’s account of acknowledging election without 
judgment and final judgment without election. 
48 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 858. 
49 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 858. 
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the guise of aid or assistance.50 Without reference to God, he writes, “a personal identity is 
shown to be worth living by its display and exercise of power to command or coerce respect 
from others,”51 indeed, to bully respect through terrifying others by political, economic, 
cultural, intellectual, or any other means.52 Similarly, “what grounds the respect worthiness 
of one’s life may [also] be seen as the power to be superior to fellow human creatures in 
one’s capacities to exercise one’s powers of conformity to the moral social order.”53 
Although an individual may have vast imperfections and do considerable violence to 
others, explicitly or implicitly, such a sense of moral superiority makes it possible to maintain 
a feeling of power and dominion over others, that has the same effect as bullying and 
coercion in terms of rendering others indebted or inferior to oneself, in “inherently 
competitive zero-sum games that are driven by constant competitive comparison with other 
human creatures.”54 Such power games, in which some must fail for others to succeed, are 
sustained on Kelsey’s conclusion by persons whose failure to ground their sense of identity 
and value in God has led them to think of themselves as the arbiters of power in the world, 
whether this power is attained through coercion or moral superiority.  
 Of course, Kelsey insists on leaving open the question whether Niebuhr was right to 
say that pride is at the root of such distortions of personal identity.55 Nevertheless, something 
very much like pride seems to emerge in his discussion as the basis for the sorts of sin 
described above and others. Thus, Kelsey calls for the relinquishment of such distorted 
personal identities and urges his readers to draw on the resources provided by practices of 
prayer to hear the voices of the oppressed. Correspondingly, we have seen, his work engages 
in a sustained way with the pressing liberation-related concerns of our times, and shows a 
sensitivity to those concerns that is to my knowledge unparalleled in prior theological 
anthropologies.  
In this and many other respects, there is nothing but cause to celebrate Kelsey’s 
accomplishment. Even so, the question could be posed as to how Kelsey might have taken his 
trajectory a step further and actually incorporated into one of his six chapters on sin an effort 
to practice what he preaches and equip those that require liberation to “understand their 
situation…discover the causes of their oppression, organize themselves into movements, and                                                         
50 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, chapter 25. 
51 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 858. 
52 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 868. 
53 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 870. 
54 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 874. 
55 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, p. 420. 
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act in a coordinated fashion.”56 Although Kelsey has certainly championed the cause of 
liberation and proves himself acutely aware of the risks involved in working for this cause 
without reference to the input of those that need to be liberated, the reader could be left 
wondering whether he has not ultimately fallen into the same trap as his modern theological 
predecessors, namely, to describe sin and what it means to overcome sin primarily from the 
perspective of a perpetrator of exclusion and oppression.  
In this connection, another reviewer has noted, there is not much in Kelsey’s account 
by way of a focused treatment of gender, sexuality, and race-related issues, which it would 
have been a considerable service to theology and the church today to provide.57 This is not so 
much a critique as a question as to how the next generation of theologians might draw on 
Kelsey’s work to set systematic theology on the right course to its logical conclusion. This of 
course is just one fruitful area of inquiry that Kelsey’s landmark work has opened up for 
contemporary theology, and it is the area I wish to consider further in the attempt that follows 
to develop a doctrine of sin from the perspective not only of the perpetrators of exclusion, but 
also of those who experience exclusion. As a preliminary to this discussion, however, I will 
sketch the classical doctrine of the image of God, which, when rightly construed, anticipates 
a diverse account of what it means to overcome sin in order to reflect the image. 
 
The Classical Doctrine of the Image of God 
 
 The first reference to the doctrine of the image of God in Aquinas’ magisterial Summa 
Theologiae occurs not in the context of any discussion of human persons but rather in the 
context of Aquinas’ treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. Aquinas speaks of the Son, the 
Second Person of the Trinity, as something like the Father’s thought of himself and thus as 
his (self) Image. 58 On his account, therefore, the Son proceeds from the Father by way of 
knowledge or intellect, because his relationship to the Father is like that of one known by a 
knower, where the one known is the knower himself, such that the known is also a knower in 
turn.59  
 In order to explain the possibility of the reflexive knowledge of the Father and Son—
or the self-knowledge of God—Aquinas further appeals to the Holy Spirit, who is said to                                                         
56 Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology (Orbis, 1996).  
57 Tom Greggs, ‘Review of Eccentric Existence’, Scottish Journal of Theology 65:4 (Nov. 
2012), pp. 449-63, see p. 462. 
58 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ST) Ia.35: on the Son as Image. 
59 ST Ia.27.2: on the generation of the Son. 
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proceed from the Father and Son not by way of intellect but by way of the will or love or 
desire for that which is known, to wit, the Son by the Father, and the Father by the Son.60 It is 
this love, or God’s Spirit, that enacts the possibility of the divine self-knowledge—that is, the 
Son’s imaging of the Father.  
 As the discussion above suggests, the doctrine of the Trinity explains the capacity of 
God not simply to be God, but also to know and communicate himself as God, to want to be 
and to act like God. In that sense, the doctrine confirms the sense in which God is worthy of 
the name ‘God’, that is, a being who always completely is what he is, which involves being 
and knowing and saying and willing and doing all that is good or consistent with love. 
 Of course, it is impossible for human beings to know God as Triune apart from the 
Incarnation of God’s Son, who revealed the Trinity by continuing to play his role in the 
divine life in the context of leading a human life, that is, by expressing his Spirit or desire to 
glorify and fulfil the purposes of the Father, which stems from his knowledge of the Father as 
the supreme good. In bringing this knowledge and desire to bear in his ordinary human 
experiences, the Son was prevented from ascribing too much significance to the objects of 
those experiences, and to de-valuing others accordingly. That is to say, he was kept from sin 
and the skewed perspective on reality and problematic actions or vices it produces.  
Through his sinless human life, he not only revealed the Triune nature of God in a 
way to which human beings could relate; he also communicated that all human beings are 
made in the image of the Trinity, that is, in his image, to do as he did as a human, namely, to 
express their spirits (lives, minds, personalities) given through the creative work of the Son 
himself in the light of the knowledge that the Father is the highest good. To this end, the 
classical doctrine of the imago dei suggests, human beings are equipped with intellect and 
will, or abilities and desires to know and to act, in the context of embodied, ordinary life. 
Although human beings as creatures of the divine are not unconstrained like God in 
terms of their abilities and interests to know and do what is good, and though their capacities 
in these respects, unlike his, must be cultivated over time, it is precisely by striving to the 
best of their abilities to realize their potential at any given time that human beings image God 
in the limited ways they can and improve in the ability to do so. That is to say, they image 
God by seeking to realize their potential as much as possible at any point in time. 
Since imaging God entails imitating Christ, whose reflection of God’s image 
empowered all human beings to do the same, there is a strong sense in which personal efforts                                                         
60 ST Ia.36. 
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to image God through the realization of God-given potential cannot be divorced or attempted 
apart from efforts to support others in their efforts to do the same. That is to say, there is no 
imaging of God which turns on disempowering others for this very purpose. By the same 
token, there is no ‘derivative’ imaging, that is, imaging of God which trades on abnegating 
personal potential—and even the self—in order to help another realize theirs.  
In sum, true imaging of God involves non-competitive relationships in which the 
imaging of one does not undermine that of the other. Although this is an admittedly difficult 
balance to achieve, it can be struck at least at the theoretical level by exposing the 
systemically sinful structures that obscure the reality that each one stands alone before God 
and must image and be enabled to image him in this way, albeit not without reference to 
human relationships.61 In what follows, therefore, I will attempt to explore what seems like 
the means of achieving equality in this regard, namely, a suitably differentiated account of 
sin, which recognizes the perspective—and hurdles to imaging God—not only of the 
included minority but also of the excluded majority.  
 
A Differentiated Account of Sin 
 
 As I aim to demonstrate further below, useful resources for developing this account, 
at least at the preliminary level, were already latent in the Aristotelian idea, appropriated by 
Thomas Aquinas, that virtue consists in a mean between two extreme forms of vice, namely, 
one of excess and one of deficiency.62 To these resources, Aquinas added another, drawn 
from a longstanding Christian tradition of referring to seven capital vices. Far from 
exhausting all possible instances of vice, this list was simply taken as an indicator of the 
‘head’ (caput) or ‘heads’ from which innumerable other vices might follow. In what follows, 
I will employ these resources in a combined form in order to develop a constructive, two-fold 
typology of sin, which provides a possible basis or model for incorporating liberation 
critiques into mainstream theological anthropology.                                                         
61 Kathryn Tanner gives an excellent account of how to achieve this balance in The Politics of 
God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992); also 
relevant in this context is her article, ‘The Difference Theological Anthropology Makes’, 
Theology Today 50.4 (Jan. 1994), pp. 567-597 and her Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity: A 
Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001). As Joy Ann McDougall argues in, 
‘Sin—No More? A Feminist Re-Envisioning of a Christian Theology of Sin’ (228), Tanner’s 
discussion in this context provides implicit resources for developing a feminist account of 
sin. 
62 See Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics II.8. 
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 Although sin may be defined as the loss of orientation towards God, it bears noting at 
the outset of this discussion that vices—what Kelsey called ‘evils’—or failures in ordinary 
human life are only formally, and not substantially, distinct from sins. As such, they are the 
means by which sins before God are ordinarily committed, namely, by over or under-
estimating the significance of temporal circumstances and goods, including the self, as a 
result of forgetting God as the highest good. Thus, the seven capital vices, which represent 
seven categories of skewed perspective on reality and of correspondingly corrupt actions, 
have frequently been described in terms of the seven ‘cardinal sins’ of pride, greed, envy, 
apathy, wrath, lust, and gluttony.  
At least since Augustine, not to mention Scripture, pride has often been described as 
the root of all sin, a view which has been contested, as we have seen, by the likes of 
Goldstein, Plaskow, and Hampson, on the grounds that it continues the longstanding and 
admittedly problematic tendency to define sin in one-sided terms, that is, from the point of 
view of self-promoting perpetrators of exclusion.63 This, however, is only the case if the 
sense is overlooked in which pride before God may manifest not only in an extreme of 
excess, namely, hubris, but also in an extreme of deficiency, that is, in false humility.64 
Whereas pride in its hubristic form is characterized by the familiar features of an 
inflated self-image or self-love that is accompanied by an exaggerated sense of personal 
entitlement, false humility by sharp contrast proceeds from a deficient self-love or sense of 
personal identity and integrity. While hubris tries to transcend normal human limitations, in 
other words, false humility renders the self worthless on account of them. It opens individuals 
up to exploitation, that is, to be treated as objects or means to achieving the ambitions of the 
hubristic, as opposed to subjects with agency and intentions of their own.  
In this connection, it is worth noting that false humility, to say nothing of hubris, is 
not necessarily a matter of personal disposition. It may be imposed upon individuals or 
classes, normally on account of some feature such as sex, race or class, which is assumed to 
justify their manipulation or exploitation—that is, their exclusion from the normal scope of 
human prerogatives and human life. Although false humility, for one, is often an ingrained 
disposition as well, it may be so in some cases precisely because cultural conventions nurture 
and even require it in, say, women and the poor.65                                                          
63 See for example Proverbs 11:2, 6:16-17. 
64 See Augustine’s Confessions, especially book II. See also Aquinas, ST 2.2.162. 
65 See for example, Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of 
Grace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), chapter 2 on ‘Women’s Nature?’. 
 16 
Whether it is cultivated by nature or nurture or some combination of the two, in any 
event, false humility as a disposition can no longer legitimately be taken as a basis for 
determining the social roles that particular individuals should fulfil. The tendency to do this 
can be overcome if the conventions whereby dispositions—or projected dispositions—that 
are unjustly connected with gender or class stereotypes, for example, are challenged by both 
men and women, rich and poor. Too often, however, such stereotypes are not contested, 
whether at the level of individual dispositions or the cultural conventions that foster systemic 
oppression, because the submissiveness of one party to another serves both parties on some 
level. While it benefits those who are served most obviously, it also allows the subservient to 
relinquish the often burdensome human responsibility to take ownership of personal agency 
and make the most of personal abilities, albeit by accepting subservience or exploitation in 
exchange. Indeed, it enables the subservient to derive a sense of identity and security simply 
from facilitating the lives of others, who navigate the world’s challenges on their behalf.  
The way in which the tendencies of the two parties play out can be traced through a 
further discussion of the other vices that follow from pride66—though not necessarily in any 
order, or in any particular combination, beyond pride and greed.67 For Aquinas, in fact, greed 
is the way in which a prideful predisposition manifests itself in practice.68 As I already 
hinted, the hubristic are characterized by a greed for their own promotion and primacy and 
are therefore prone to treat other persons and objects as objects to be used for their own ends 
and devices. Such objectification, even if it is the product of an unconscious bias, can occur 
in a wide range of ways, not merely physical, as in the case of lust and gluttony, but also at 
more personal or intellectual levels, on which the falsely humble may find themselves barred 
from lifestyles and areas or approaches to inquiry that press the boundaries of the social roles 
that have been set for them by the hubristic, or that test the limits of standard hubristic 
approaches in general.  
By contrast to the hubristic, the falsely humble generally exhibit a proclivity to seek 
their own obliteration or incorporation into the plans of others, however vicious, and however 
much this may involve forfeiting the basic human right, and responsibility, to cultivate 
personal capabilities.69 On some level, theirs is a greed for pain and self-destruction, whether 
it is a matter of personal desire or systemic enforcement. Often, I have noted, it involves                                                         
66 ST 2.1.77.4.  
67 ST 2.1.73.1. 
68 ST 2.1.84.1-2. 
69 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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some of both, given how local cultures and social conventions form personal dispositions in 
the way described above. 
The five further vices are the means through which individuals direct themselves 
towards different and mutually exclusive ends, in accordance with the objects of their greed. 
These ends bring them into conflict with one another, where virtue unites persons with 
diverse objectives under the overarching purpose of operating in light of the knowledge that 
God rather than any human consideration is the highest good. In Aquinas’ account, the order 
in which the subsequent vices are enumerated traces a progression from more spiritual to 
physical vices.70  
The spiritual vices of pride, greed, envy, and apathy are described as ‘cold-hearted’ or 
reputable, because they are indirect and thus covert and are therefore relatively easy to 
conceal. In the case of such vices, individuals do not strictly speaking perform vicious deeds. 
Instead, they fail to do the things they ought to do, or take up tasks other than those that are 
most important or deserving of attention, in ways that cause considerable damage or loss of 
opportunity for others. By contrast to the cold-hearted vices, the physical or warm-hearted 
vices of wrath, lust and gluttony are direct and overt.71  
The first and most serious of the reputable vices is envy.72 While this vice sometimes 
causes persons to covet the belongings of others, it can also entail a rather more sinister 
desire simply to eradicate evidence that others possess property, achievements, capabilities, 
or even personal qualities that differ from one’s own; or to ensure that persons who differ 
from oneself in some respect—perhaps to do with race or sex—do not have access to the 
same resources and opportunities as are readily available to persons of one’s own kind. In 
other words, envy may turn on a desire to eliminate difference.  
When it comes to hubristic envy, the desire to do away with difference tends to 
express itself in withholding due recognition, credit, support, or protection from those 
envied.73 By the same token, it often involves demonstrations of favoritism towards, or an 
exclusive focus on, those similar to oneself, even if they are not the most deserving or needy 
of assistance.74 Though the envious may make no direct attempts to marginalize and oppress 
others by these means, they nevertheless render it virtually impossible for those they envy to 
succeed and thrive in the areas where they are excluded. On some level, moreover, they                                                         
70 ST 2.1.72.2. 
71 ST 2.2.142.2. 
72 ST 2.2.36.1. 
73 ST 2.1.71.5. 
74 ST 2.2.63. 
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objectify the excluded by forcing on them a situation where there is no alternative but to 
serve the agenda of the envious, whether intellectual or practical, or else be forced to suffer 
the consequences of total exclusion by the arbiters of social power. 
  By contrast, the falsely humble seek in envy to eliminate the differences they 
themselves exhibit, so as to benefit from the solidarity and protection of the socio-
economically or intellectually powerful. Their form of envy may express itself through 
servility, or efforts self-deprecatingly to affirm the primacy of the powerful with a view to 
gaining a place, however lowly, within their regime. In the case of both extremes, however, 
the vice committed is cold-hearted, precisely because envy is disguised in the form of 
assisting or praising other persons.  
Although it would fall outside the scope of this paper to elaborate how, it stands to 
reason that envy is one of the main impetuses behind the prolongation of extreme poverty, 
which is protested by liberation theologians; the marginalization of persons with disabilities, 
cognitive or physical; the ongoing relegation of women to jobs that in some way involve 
helping men do their jobs—and the traumatic, constant battle women face if they aspire let 
alone manage to succeed in accomplishing anything more than this; and above all, the lack of 
consideration for liberation concerns on the part of mainstream theologies. 
Whereas hubris generates excess and false humility deficiency in the case of envy, the 
situation is exceptionally reversed when it comes to the next vice of apathy. The excessive 
form of this vice, which arises from false humility, entails rash or reckless behavior, while 
the deficient form, proper to hubris, consists in lethargy, laziness, or lack of ambition.75 
These forms of passivity arguably spring from hubris’ inflated sense of self and 
corresponding unwillingness to confront normal human limitations.  
Ineluctably, such reluctance manifests in refusals to take risks or countenance 
unknown or potentially challenging situations in which those limitations might be revealed. 
Thus, the excessive form of the vice in question gives rise to cowardice, a form of indirect 
action in which individuals fail to fulfill their responsibilities or come to the aid of others out 
of a fear of being exposed as ignorant or incapable in some respect. Alternatively, they may 
exhibit lethargy on the assumption that they are ‘above’ assuming various and especially 
trivial responsibilities, which are thereby imposed on the aforementioned majority, including 
women, racial minorities, and the poor, whose time is unjustly regarded as less important.  
                                                        
75 ST 2.2.125-7. 
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Because the falsely humble generally lack or are denied a sense of personal identity 
and purpose, or the self-confidence to cultivate one, they are prone to take up these 
responsibilities. They are reckless or rash precisely because they frequently or habitually 
abandon their own projects, even that of personal development, albeit oftentimes by tacit or 
overt force, in order to organize their lives and plans around the demands of others, whether 
those demands are explicit or implicit. Since the rash are unwilling or unable to establish 
principles by which to prioritize their activities, decline requests or respond to needs—
whether real or perceived—they tend to engage in a host of trivial, insignificant, and diffuse 
activities that not only prevent them from employing their own abilities but even from 
realizing what those are.  
While the cold-hearted vices largely turn on indirect action, I have noted that the 
warm-hearted vices of wrath, lust and gluttony involve direct action, which is why they are 
more easily recognizable and thus less ‘reputable’.76 In its hubristic form, wrath lashes out in 
a long list of ways, which on Aquinas’ account includes robbery; cheating, murder, injury, 
derision, defamation of character, discord or contrariety of wills, contention or contrariety of 
speech, strife or contrariety of actions, schism, and so on.77 
In the case of false humility, wrath turns on a deficiency in due anger, or an over-
willingness to reconcile with or remain subjected to the harmful influence of oppressors.78 
Both wrath and such over-compliance or over-submissiveness flow from an urge towards 
self-protection, which motivates hostile attempts at self-defense in the case of hubris, and 
renders the falsely humble reluctant to defend themselves in threatening or degrading 
situations, out of fear of the penalties they may incur for resisting their own mistreatment and 
exploitation.  
The excessive form of the next vice of lust is shamelessness with regard to sexual 
fixations, perversion, or the sexual exploitation of others; it is the ‘sensuality’ to which 
Niebuhr referred. The deficient form of this vice, which he neglected to mention, involves 
shamefulness or unwarranted disgust at or disregard for personal sexuality, which may allow 
for its exploitation.79 Though lust is a vice that is typically associated with human sexuality, I 
would argue that it can also be more generally defined in terms of an overpowering desire for 
or reluctance to embrace any particular good, including fame, power, wealth, and even some                                                         
76 ST 2.2.158.6.   
77 ST 2.2.37-39, 41, 64-8, 72-8. 
78 ST 2.2.158; see also Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics II.4, 122b1-4. 
79 ST 2.2.153-4. 
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immaterial goods such as knowledge, causes, and so on. In short, any good that becomes an 
object of obsession, even by way of unhealthy or self-destructive aversion, can be said to be 
an object of lust.  
A similar principle applies to the last vice of gluttony, which concerns the goods of 
the body by contrast to those of the external world. Though gluttony is ordinarily supposed to 
manifest in any inordinate—self-indulgent or self-depriving, excessive or deficient—desire 
for food or drink, it might also be said to express itself in the pursuit or avoidance of any 
substance or activity that is relevant to the physical needs—life, health, hygiene—of the 
body.80 Though the excessive form of this vice is quite common, particularly in the West, 
there are many contexts in which women and other marginalized parties experience the 
deficient form of this vice. They are literally mal-nourished, even to the point of starvation, 
so that others locally and globally can enjoy nourishment and good health.  
 
An ‘All-Inclusive’ Theology 
 
Although the taxonomy of sin outlined above has not added all that much that is new 
to the existing body of work on the ‘other’ experience of sin, it has provided a framework in 
which existing critical and constructive work stemming largely from the experience of 
‘minorities’ can be situated, and through which it can perhaps be elaborated and systematised 
in greater detail in the future. This framework is of additional significance in that it naturally 
incorporates the perspective of both of the parties in question and thus provides a basic model 
for integrating the concerns of liberation thinkers into mainstream systematic theology, 
particularly in the field of theological anthropology.  
While a scholar like David Kelsey has already taken considerable strides in this 
regard, we have seen that there is more work to be done when it comes to extrapolating the 
logical conclusions of his project. In the case of theological anthropology, this is precisely the 
work of replacing a tendency to treat sin in a rather one-sided manner with a two-fold 
typology of sin, which gives a voice not merely to those who have the power to liberate but 
also to those that require to be liberated. As I have already noted in my treatment of some 
feminist critiques of the traditional doctrine of sin as ‘pride’, a biased or one-sided account of 
sin tends to feed into the sin tendencies of those who experience sin as false humility. That in 
                                                        
80 ST 2.2.148, 150. 
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turn places the hubristic in the optimal position to take advantage of their counterparts and so 
to sin in their own way.  
Although it is more obviously and destructively the case that the falsely humble are 
prevented from overcoming sin and imaging God under these circumstances, the image is 
likewise undermined in those that objectify the falsely humble, even if less obviously or 
destructively so. As this suggests, it is difficult if not impossible for both parties to image 
God, let alone to articulate a sound theological anthropology, while equal attention is not 
given to the obstacles to imitating Christ that present themselves to both the hubristic and the 
falsely humble. Since the latter require different tools for this purpose, one could go so far as 
to say that Christian teaching that neglects to offer those tools passively precludes their status 
as images of God, thereby giving license to objectify and maintain in suppression those that 
most need and deserve ‘subjectification’.  
For this reason, liberation theologies have made “an appeal to all theologians, of the 
First, Second, and Third world, calling them to work out the social-liberative dimension of 
faith.” This “is a once-and-for-all-appeal: once theology as a whole has assimilated this call 
and made it its own, then the name ‘liberation theology’ can be dropped, because by then all 
theologies will be liberation theologies in their own way—otherwise they will not be 
Christian theologies.”81 While I would not necessarily wish to endorse all theologies of 
liberation or feminism and the extremes to which some of them have resorted, I would echo 
the sentiment that theologies that remain unconcerned with liberation go so far in many 
respects as to thwart the whole purpose of theology—and the gospel. 
As one well-known liberation theologian has written, “the gospel is not aimed chiefly 
at ‘modern’ men and women in their critical spirit but first and foremost at ‘non-persons’ 
whose basic dignity and rights are denied them.”82 That is to say, its purpose is to unleash the 
God-given potential of those in whom that potential is most suppressed—a purpose which is 
defeated through theologies that compound the suppression of the suppressed by failing to 
equip them with the same level of resource available to, if not employed by, the hubristic for 
overcoming sin, imaging God, and finally, thereby, being human. This, in fact, is the ultimate 
telos not only of theological anthropology, but also of systematic theology overall. The task 
is to continue the work of Christ who came to rehabilitate his image in all persons, by 
articulating an all-inclusive theology that is consistent with the life-giving Spirit of his work.  
                                                          
81 Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology, p. 92. 
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